Non-state actors, ungoverned spaces and international responsibility for cyber acts by Tsagourias, N.
This is a repository copy of Non-state actors, ungoverned spaces and international 
responsibility for cyber acts.
White Rose Research Online URL for this paper:
http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/105177/
Version: Accepted Version
Article:
Tsagourias, N. (2016) Non-state actors, ungoverned spaces and international 
responsibility for cyber acts. Journal of Conflict and Security Law, 21 (3). pp. 455-474. 
ISSN 1467-7954 
https://doi.org/10.1093/jcsl/krw020
eprints@whiterose.ac.uk
https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/
Reuse 
Items deposited in White Rose Research Online are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved unless 
indicated otherwise. They may be downloaded and/or printed for private study, or other acts as permitted by 
national copyright laws. The publisher or other rights holders may allow further reproduction and re-use of 
the full text version. This is indicated by the licence information on the White Rose Research Online record 
for the item. 
Takedown 
If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by 
emailing eprints@whiterose.ac.uk including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request. 
1 
 
 
Non-state actors, ungoverned spaces and international responsibility for cyber 
acts 
 Nicholas Tsagourias* 
Abstract 
This article examines the question of whether states can be held responsible for the 
malicious cyber activities of non-state actors operating from ungoverned spaces. After 
examining relevant rules of the law of state responsibility, it concludes that there is a 
responsibility deficit. For this reason, it puts forward a proposal for holding non-state 
actors that exercise effective power over territories and people directly responsible for 
their malicious cyber activities. In this respect, it considers the scope of their obligations, 
issues of attribution as well as issues concerning the implementation of their 
responsibility. It however acknowledges that many non-   Ǯvirtualǯ 
groups still remain outside legal regulation.  
 
Words: responsibility, non-state actors, ungoverned spaces, virtual groups, legal 
personality, attribution, implementation of responsibility  
 
I. Introduction 
The international law literature on ungoverned spaces1, such as those in Somalia, 
Congo, Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Syria2, is replete with warnings about the security 
threats that such places pose to states, people or the international society at large.3 Such 
places are viewed as breeding grounds for non-state actors to pursue nefarious 
activities such as terrorist attacks, crime, or fraud with cyberspace becoming a locus or 
medium through which such activities are incited, facilitated, or committed.4 For 
                                                 
* Professor of International Law, University of Sheffield (Nicholas.Tsagourias@sheffield.ac.uk). I would 
like to thank Professor Michael Schmitt for his comments on a previous draft. The usual disclaimer 
applies.   
1 Anne L. Clunan and Harold A. , Trinkunas (eds), Ungoverned Spaces. Alternatives to State Authority in an 
Era of Softened Sovereignty, (Stanford University Press, 2010). Ungoverned spaces can include whole 
states or areas in states 
2 ǯ
ǡ   ? ? ? ?ǡ ǡǡǡ
and Libya are placed between 11 and 5 points on a 100 (highest) points scale.  
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home (accessed 31 January 2016) 
 
 
3 Robert D. Lamb, Ungoverned Areas and Threats from Safe Havens: Final Report of the Ungoverned Areas 
Project (Washington: Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy Planning, 2008) 
http://cissmdev.devcloud.acquia-sites.com/sites/default/files/papers/ugash_report_final.pdf ; 
Quadrennial Defense Review 2014 at 
http://archive.defense.gov/pubs/2014_Quadrennial_Defense_Review.pdf (accessed 31 December 2015) 
 
4 Cybersecurity: Jihadism and the internet, May 2015 at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2015/557006/EPRS_ATA%282015%29557006
_EN.pdf (accessed 31 December 2015) 
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example, ISIS, a non-state actor, operates from territories that it seized in Syria and Iraq 
and engages in criminal activities in the physical world as well as through and in 
cyberspace. ISIS has been quite deft in using the internet for its own purposes and it has 
tried to build its own Ǯcyber armyǯ. For this reason, a number of groups were created 
with the most prominent being the Cyber Caliphate (Caliphate Cyber Army CCA) created 
by the British born Junaid Hussain famed for hacking Tony Blair and killed in a drone 
attack; the Islamic State Hacking Division (ISHD) created by a Kosovar hacker killed by a 
drone; the Islamic Cyber Army (ICA); the Rabitat Al-Ansar (League of Supporters); or 
the Sons Caliphate Army (SCA) among others. According to recent reports, ISIS merged 
cyber groups into one group the United Cyber Caliphate (UCC).5  
These groups are responsible for numerous cyber attacks on media, Universities, 
governmental departments, local authorities, military bodies, non-profit organisations, 
or businesses.6 For example, they seized control of TV5Monde, France's international 
TV network, an attack that the French government dubbed an "act of terrorism",7 
broadcasted propaganda videos and the personal information and resumes of French 
soldiers fighting extremist groups;  hacked Newsweek's social media accounts to issue a 
direct threat to the US president's wife and children; or took control of the US Central 
Command YouTube account to post terrorist propaganda videos.8 Although none of 
these attacks caused any serious damage, with ISIS currently using the internet mainly 
for propaganda, funding and recruiting purposes, it does not mean that ISIS or other 
non-state actors cannot in time acquire the resources to launch damaging attacks on 
people or states. As George Osborne the British Chancellor said in a speech to GCHQ ǮISIS, that means tackling their cyber threat as well as the ǡǤǯ9 Indeed, the US has recently announced that it is 
                                                 
5  	ǯ ǡ Hacking for ISIS: The Emergent Cyber Threat Landscape at 
https://www.flashpoint-intel.com/news/flashpoint-issues-new-report-demonstrating-advancement-of-
isis-organized-cyber-capabilities/ (accessed 31 April 2016) 
6 For a list of such activities see Steven Stalinsky and R. Sosnow, Hacking In The Name Of The Islamic State 
(ISIS), Inquiry & Analysis Series No. 1183,  August 21, 2015 at http://www.memrijttm.org/hacking-in-
the-name-of-the-islamic-state-isis.html#_ednref4 (accessed 31 December 2015) 
 
7 ISIL hackers seize control of France's TV5Monde network in 'unprecedented' attack, The Telegraph (3 
April 2015), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/france/11525016/Isil-hackers-
seize-control-of-Frances-TV5Monde-network-in-unprecedented-attack.html (accessed 31 December 
2015) 
Aurellien Breeden and Alissa J, Rubin, French Broadcaster TV5 Monde Recovers After Hacking NYTimes 
(April 5, 2015) http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/10/world/europe/french-broadcaster-tv5-monde-
recovers-after-hacking.html (accessed 31 December 2015) 
 
8 Supra n 6  
9 Chancellor's speech to GCHQ on cyber security 15 November 2015.  
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/chancellors-speech-to-gchq-on-cyber-security 
3 
  Ǥ   ǮOur cyberoperations are 
disrupting their command-and-FRQWURODQGFRPPXQLFDWLRQV¶10        
Ungoverned spaces are not just a security threat; they are also a systemic threat to the 
international legal order because they challenge certain basic principles of that order. In 
the first place, they challenge the concept of statehood which is a central tenet of the 
international legal order and following from this, they pose a challenge to the legal 
institutions attached to statehood and which make the international legal order 
operational, as for example the institution of state responsibility. The reason why 
ungoverned spaces pose a systemic threat to the international legal order is because 
they are characterised by lack or diminution of effective state power which is a 
necessary condition for maintaining internal as well as external order and for realising 
international law.  
In this article I will examine the implications for the law of state responsibility of 
ungoverned spaces when non-state actors operating from them engage in malicious 
cyber activities. For this reason, I will first explain the concept of Ǯ ǯ
and the challenges that ungoverned spaces pose to the institution of state responsibility. 
Reaching the uncomfortable conclusion that in such cases the  Ǯesponsibility ǯǡ     to explore the possibilities and conditions under which 
responsibility can be ascribed directly to non-state actors exercising power over such 
spaces.   
 
ǤǮungoverned spaceǯ 
Since the article is concerned with ungoverned spaces, it is important to offer a 
definition of this concept. An ungoverned space is defined according to a RAND report  ǲȏȐ           Ǥ
Ungoverned territories can be failed or failing states, poorly controlled land or maritime 
borders,          ǯ   Ǥǯ11 Similarly, according to a 2008 Department of Defense 
Report, an ungoverned space ǲ -governed, misgoverned, contested, 
and exploitable areas Ǥǳ12 In international law and relations 
literature there are many different terms to describe states or territories that fail to 
demonstrate the customary attributes of statehood in the fields of peace, security, order, 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
10 U.S. Cyberattacks Target ISIS in a New Line of Combat, N.Y. Times, April 24, 2016 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/25/us/politics/us-directs-cyberweapons-at-isis-for-first-
time.html?_r=0 (accessed 31 April 2016) 
 
11 A. Rabassa et al. ȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍǲǣ Ǥǳ Project Air Force. RAND Corporation, XV at  
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2007/RAND_MG561.pdf (accessed 31 
December 2015) 
12 ǡǮǯǡ ? 
. 
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and governance. ǮǯǤAccording 
to 
         Ǯ ǯǡ        Ǯ         
int ǯǤ13 Similarly, according to Thürerǡ ǮȏȐ State is usually 
considered to have failed when the power structures providing political support for law 
and order have collapsed, or are non-existent to the extent that the State ceases to be an      Ǥǯ1415 Ungoverned spaces and failed 
states share many similarities because they both refer to the erosion of state capacity      Ǯ ǯ        
spectrum of ungovernmentability in geographic or governance terms. The concept of ǮǯǮǯ
describe a situation where there is total and overall loss of state capacity in geographic 
and governance terms but also situations where state capacity gradually or suddently 
recedes from parts of an otherwise functioning state.   
 ǡǡǮungoverned spaceǯ
constructed against a state-centric reading of international law and relations by 
describing the absence or the cession of state authority and, secondly, that an Ǯungoverned spaceǯ does not necessarily imply a power vacuum because there may be 
different forms and levels of authority exercised by non-state actors. In other words, 
ungoverned spaces do not preclude alternative structures and forms of authority 
instituted by non-state actors.16  
That having been said, ungoverned spaces even if they are governed by non-state actors 
pose serious challenges to international law because the whole edifice of international 
law is premised on statehood and indeed on its effectiveness. When the institution of 
the state becomes ineffective or disappears, international law loses the propulsion 
which would allow it to function as a normative system and this is also the case when 
international law fails to recognise alternative forms of effective power.    
  
III. International law and state effectiveness  
As was said in the preceding section, international law is premised on effectiveness. 
Effectiveness is about a set of affairs, relations or situations that exist in fact.17 
International law often normativises such set of affairs. For example, it recognises the 
demonstrations and relations of power over territory and people as a state and gives it 
                                                 
13 ǤǤ ?ǡǮ	ǯ, 89 Foreign Policy 3 (Winter 1992-93), 5-
6.  
14 D. Thürer Ǯ	ǯMPEPIL, para 4 
15 Netherlands Advisory Council on International Affairs Netherlands Advisory Council on Issues of Public 
International Law AIV/CAVV  Failing States: a Global Responsibility, Report  No. 35, May 2004, 11  
16 Ǥǡ Ǯǣ ǯǡǯ
Cato Institute, December 9, 2014 at http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa766_1.pdf 
(accessed 31 January 2016) 
17 C. De Visscher, Les effectivités du droit international public (Paris, Pédone, 1967) 
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legal status. A state is thus the recognition by international law of an effective set of 
relations. This is ingrained in the traditional definition of statehood according to which 
one of the criteria of statehood is effective government in the sense of an authority that 
can exercise effective power over territory and people.18 ǮȏȐhe 
proposition that statehood is a question of fact derives strong support from this 
equation of effectiveness and statehood. In other words, although it is admitted that 
effectiveness in this context is a legal requirement, it is denied that there can exist legal       ǯǤ19 Effectiveness was also an issue in 
the Aaland Arbitration. Regarding 	ǯ, it was opined that Ǯ[f]or a 
considerable time, the conditions required for the formation of a sovereign State did not 
exist. In the midst of revolution and anarchy, certain elements essential to the existence 
of a State, even some elements of fact, were lacking for a fairly considerable period. 
Political and social life was disorganized; the authorities were not strong enough to 
assert themselves . . . the Government has been chased from the capital and forcibly 
prevented from carrying out its duties . . . . It is therefore difficult to say at what exact 
date the Finnish Republic, in the legal sense of the term, actually became a definitely 
constituted sovereign State. This certainly did not take place until a stable political 
organization had been created, and until the public authorities had become strong 
enough to assert themselves throughout the territories of the State without the 
assistance of foreign troops.20  
 
The state, being recognised as an effectivity (effectivité)  and indeed as the original 
effectivity in international law, is also the condition for the realisation of international 
law. International law is a normative system; it contains postulates. International law 
does not possess any superimposing authority, neither does it have an ingrained factual 
mechanism to make it real that is, to implement it, ensure respect of its rules or enforce 
these rules. In international law the power that makes international law real and 
effective is the state and indeed an effective state. Legal effectiveness is thus dependent 
on state effectiveness. From that it transpires that there is a mutually reinforcing 
relation between effectiveness, statehood and international law in that international 
law recognises effectiveness in the form of statehood and (effective) statehood is a 
condition for the effectiveness of international law. This was alluded to in the Isle of 
Palmas Ǯ[i]nternational law, the structure of which is not 
based on any super-state organisation, cannot be presumed to reduce a right such as 
territorial sovereignty, with which almost all international relations are bound up, to 
the category of an abstract rightǡǯǤ21  
That having been said, it is true that in the post-colonial era a juridical notion of 
statehood has been promoted according to which lack of effectiveness does not prevent 
an entity in acceding to statehood or in retaining its status as state. Although there have 
been many other considerations Ȃmoral as well as political - behind such a theory, there 
has also been a strong presumption or expectation that the state will (re)gain 
effectiveness and international law proceeded on that basis to treat such entities as 
equal members of the international society of states.  
                                                 
18 Art 1, Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States 1933 
19 J. Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law, (CUP, 2007) 106 and ch 1 
20 LNOJ spec supp no 4 (1920) 8Ȃ9 
21 Island of Palmas (the United States v. the Netherlands), 2 RIAA (1928) 840 
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It is in how international law treats effectiveness that the threat posed by ungoverned 
spaces to the international legal order can be revealed. When the state loses 
effectiveness and becomes ungoverned, it may retain its juridical character as a state 
with all the privileges, rights and duties attached thereto but, in effect, it is not able to 
fulfil the legal expectations attached to statehood, whereas when its effectiveness 
recedes from certain areas, it cannot fully fulfil these expectations. Moreover, other 
actors may exercise power over those areas but, if these actors are not recognised by 
international law as carriers of rights and duties, international law again looses its 
effectiveness. As Somalia and other similar cases show, when notions of statehood are 
promoted which decouple the legal from the factual aspect of statehood or when 
alternative forms of effective governance are not recognised, they cause serious legal 
problems because they create Ǯǯ   Ǯǯ    
outside the international law threshold.22 For this reason, the factual and legal 
dimensions of authority over territories and people should correlate as for international 
law and the international legal order to be realised.  
  
IV. Ǯngoverned spacesǯ   challenge to the institution of state 
responsibility  
 
The law of state responsibility exemplifies the correlation between legal and factual 
effectiveness. To explain, state responsibility arises when a state controls territory over 
which a wrongful act is committed or from where it emanates as the ICJ opined in its 
Namibia Advisory Opinion23  or when it controls people who commit a wrongful act. As Ǯ
on the organisation of power and the effectiveness of the control maintained in its     ǯ  he went on to say  Ǯ    [state] ǯǤ24.  
What are then the challenges posed to the institution of state responsibility by 
ungoverned spaces? 
As it is well known, the law of state responsibility is premised on the distinction 
between primary and secondary rules with primary rules referring to international law 
obligations whose violation triggers the secondary rules of the law of state 
responsibility. When there is total lack of government, the state cannot assume 
international law obligations because it does not have an effective government to bind 
it. With no obligations, there is no responsibility. When ungovernmentability instead is 
confined to certain areas of its territory, the scope of its responsibility is accordingly 
circumscribed. Of course, the state as juridical person continues to be bound by existing 
international law but its responsibility is conterminous to its effectiveness. Moreover, as 
                                                 
22 G. Kreijen, State Failure, Sovereignty and Effectiveness: Legal lessons from the decolonization of sub-
Saharan Africa. (Leiden,  Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2004) 
23 As tǮǡǡ     ǯ Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South 
Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory 
Opinion, I.C.J. Rep (1971), p. 16, para 118 
24 C. De Visscher, Theory and reality in public international law, trans. from the French by P.E.Corbett 
(Princeton, N.J. , Princeton U.P., 1968)  285 
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will be discussed later, questions may arise as to who acts on behalf of the state when 
the state apparatus collapses or when its government is contested by other actors. 
Furthermore, even if state responsibility is established, the state may not be able to 
comply with Part II of the Articles on State Responsibility concerning the content of the 
international responsibility. For example, how can a state comply with the obligation to 
cease the unlawful act or to provide reparation if no functioning state apparatus 
exists?25 In other words, there is asymmetry between formal obligations and the ǯ
material capacity to ensure respect of those obligations. 
 
At the same time, non-state actors that exercise power over territories and people are 
not bound by international law according to the prevailing opinion, with notable 
exceptions such as humanitarian and international criminal law. The latter obligations 
give rise to narrower forms of responsibility but the issue here is that the obligations 
and the ensuing responsibility of non-state actors who exercise power over territories 
and people are not conterminous to the scope and extent of their powers. One may 
contend that non-state actors are bound by international law through domestic law but 
this is not the case when a state cannot implement or enforce international law 
domestically. Again, respect by non-state actors of international law on the basis of the 
theory of legislative jurisdiction depends on state effectiveness.  
To explain how this situation would affect the institution of responsibility for malicious 
cyber activities, a state with no functioning government cannot assume conventional 
obligations concerning cyberspace such as those deriving from the ITU Convention, the 
WTO system or from other subject-specific treaties. Even if a state becomes party to 
such treaties or remains bound by existing treaty law or by customary law, it cannot 
implement or enforce its obligations wholly or partially, if it suffers from 
ungovernmentability. Conversely, non-state actors operating from its territory and 
using its cyber infrastructure for their cyber activities cannot become parties to 
international agreements and, in any case, they are not bound by international law 
according to the prevailing international legal opinion. For this reason, they cannot be 
held responsible because they do not breach obligations incumbent on them.  
Another critical feature of the law of state responsibility which affects its realisation in 
this instance is that it is premised on the distinction between public and private acts 
according to which a state is not held responsible for private or non-state conduct. This 
aspect of the law of state responsibility is reflected in the legal concept of attribution.  Ǯǯ-state act by transforming it into a public (state) act.26 
Attribution is based on an institutional, a functional and an agency test. The institutional 
test attributes the acts of ǯde jure or de facto organs to that state.27 Whereas a de 
jure ǯǡde facto organ is one that is 
                                                 
25 Article 30 and 31 ASR 
26 Art 2 ASR;   	ǡ Ǯ     ǣ  ǯ  
Crawford, Alain Pellet and Simon Olleson (eds), The Law of International responsibility (OUP 2010) 257  
270. Also see «ǯ.  
27 Art 4 ASR; Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v 
USA) (Merits) [1986] ICJ Rep 14, para 109 (hereinafter refereed to as Nicaragua Case); Application of the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia 
and Montenegro) (Judgment of 26 February 2007) [2007] ICJ Rep paras 307, 385, 390-393 (hereinafter 
referred to as Bosnia Genocide Case). J. Crawford, State Responsibility-The general Part (CUP, 2013) 124-
126. 
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assimilated to or absorbed in the state apparatus. The functional test attributes acts to a 
state if they are committed by an entity that is empowered by that state to exercise 
governmental authority or if the act is committed by an organ of another state that has 
been placed at the disposal of the first state. 28 Finally, according to the agency test, an 
act is attributed to a state if it is committed by an individual or a group that have been 
instructed or directed by a state or when the act has been executed under the effective 
control of a state. 29  
It becomes apparent that the attribution standards in the law of state responsibility 
reflect the Ǯǯof statehood as an arrangement consisting of people that act 
on its behalf by submitting to its effective power. The state is not envisaged as a purely 
normative entity because, in that instance, there would be no need to establish a link 
between a person and a state or between specific acts and a state but a state would be 
held responsible for all wrongful acts committed within that state, emanating from its 
territory or committed by its citizens. Instead, aǡǮ
important role played by the principle of effectiveness in international law, the 
existence of a real link between the person or group performing the act and the state ǯ Ǥ 30 In the absence of a structured governmental and institutional 
apparatus or in the face of competing structures of authority some of which are not 
states, none of the aforementioned attribution criteria can be satisfied.  
For instance, injurious physical or cyber acts by ISIS or by pro-ISIS cyber groups cannot 
be attributed to Syria and hold it responsible because none of the aforementioned 
attribution criteria can be fulfilled; they cannot also be attributed to ISIS because it is 
not a state or a subject of international law with international law obligations. These 
acts will thus be treated as private acts for purposes of state responsibility. They may of 
course breach domestic, Syrian, law or trigger individual criminal responsibility to the 
extent that they constitute international crimes but this raises the question of whether 
Syria has the capacity to enforce its law over ISIS and over ISIS held areas as well as 
whether international courts and tribunals have jurisdiction over ISIS members or the 
capacity to bring those responsible to justice.  
The Articles on State Responsibility recognise two instances where a state can be held 
responsible for the acts of non-state actors without the need of attribution. According to 
Article 9 ASR, the conduct of a person or a group exercising elements of governmental 
authority of a particular state in the absence or default of the official authorities can be 
considered an act of that state. This covers situations where there is total or partial 
collapse of governmental authority and a necessity arises to exercise certain 
governmental functions which are performed by non-state actors.31 Article 9 ASR 
situations do not envisage authorisation by the government but the non-state acts are 
considered to be state acts because of their governmental nature and because they are ǮǯǤApplied to cyberspace, this provision may give rise to a number of problems.  
The first challenge is to determine which functions are governmental in view of the 
contemporary trend to privatise or to contract out public services. One could say that 
                                                 
28 Articles 5 and 6 ASR. 
29 Art 8 ASR. Nicaragua Case, paras 116-117; Bosnia Genocide Case, paras 398, 402-406, 413-414. Aslo see «ǯ 
30 James Crawford, ǯsponsibility (CUP 2002) 110. 
31 Crawford, ǯ, 114-115 
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taxation, policing, defence and justice still remain core state functions32 but this leads to 
the second challenge which is whether there is any space for non-state actors in the 
situations envisaged by Article 9 ASRǤǯ-
state actors even if governance migrates to cyber. It is true that many governmental 
services nowadays migrate to cyber33 with Estonia being pioneer in rolling out 
governmental data online to allow the country to run even if it is physically occupied.34 
It is submitted that even in this case, the government will not be able to fulfil some of its 
functions, for example policing or defence, which can be performed by a non-state actor 
with physical presence on the territory. A non-state actor may also take over the 
government cloud where all governmental services or data are stored and perform 
various other functions, for example collect taxes or provide judicial functions. In other 
words, article 9 ASR can also apply to cyber governance. The third challenge is whether 
any involvement by the non-state actor in illegal activities such as terrorism or illegal 
trade will affect the application of Article 9 ASR. For instance, ISIS provides state-like 
services but, at the same time, engages in criminal activities and commits serious 
violations of international law.35 There is no clear-cut answer to this question but it is ǯew that violations of jus cogens norms will exclude non-state actors from 
the purview of Article 9 ASR because these norms are the most fundamental norms of 
the international system. That having been said, it should be noted that Article 9 ASR 
covers only temporary and spontaneous assumptions of authority and not long term 
ones as it is the case with Hezbollah in Lebanon or the different groups that govern 
parts of Somalia. Furthermore, Article 9 ASR is about the voluntary assumption by non-
state actors of governmental responsibilities and not about situations where they 
assume power by incapacitating the government. This means that even if ISIS exercises 
governmental powers, its governmental activities were ǮǯǤ 
The other instance where conduct of non-state actors is considered an act of state is 
contained in Article 10 ASR according to which the conduct of an insurrectional or other 
movements that succeed in replacing an existing government or in establishing a new 
state on the territory of an existing state are considered an act of that state. An Ǯ ǯ            ? Additional 
Protocol II (1977) as one that is organised and controls territory, usually in the same 
state as the government against which it has revolted.36 It is not however clear whether 
                                                 
32 Yeager v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 324-10199-1 (Iran-U.S. Claims Trib. Nov. 2, 1987) 104 
33 See HM Government, Government Cloud Strategy (March 2011) 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/266214/government-
cloud-strategy_0.pdf (accessed 31 December 2015) 
34 https://e-estonia.com/ 
 
35 Principles in the Administration of the Islamic State 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/07/islamic-state-document-masterplan-for-power 
(accessed 31 December 2015) 
Report of the Secretary-
ȋǯȌ
and the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States in countering the threat, S/2016/92 
(29 January 2016); Muhammad al-Ǯǡahoud, Daniel Milton, Bryan Price,  
The Group That Calls Itself a State: Understanding the Evolution and Challenges of the Islamic State, The 
Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) at West Point  (December 2014) at www.ctc.usma.edu 
 
36 Article 1 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the 
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 June 1977. Article 10 ASR, 
commentary para 9.  ICTY, Prosecutor v Limaj, Bala and Musliu, Judgement, IT-03-66-T, Trial Chamber II, 
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Article 10 ASR applies only to movements with territorial control. First, Article 10 ASR    Ǯ ǯ   Ǥ            Ǯǯ Ǥ ǡ Article 10 
ASR mentions insurrectional movements that act from within another state which 
allows for movements that do not control territory of the state they succeed in 
replacing. Thirdly, it mentions acts of insurrectional movements from the beginning of 
the insurrection at which point there may not have established territorial control. One 
can thus say with reason that territorial control is not necessary but what is necessary is 
some form of organisation.  
That said, Article 10 ASR limits the scope of state responsibility. More specifically, the 
state will be held responsible for violations committed by the insurrectional movement 
as well as for those committed by the previous government when the insurrectional 
movement replaces the government, whereas when a new state is established by a 
movement, it will be held responsible only for violations committed by that movement. 
The scope of state responsibility is limited even further by the fact that insurrectional or 
other movements have limited international law obligations and by the fact that 
attribution is quite demanding as will be seen later. Another limitation is that Article 10 
ASR does not deal with the responsibility of groups that have not been successful in 
forming a state and exonerates from responsibility groups that participate in a power 
sharing agreement.  
For example, if ISIS or any of the groups fighting in Syria succeeds in establishing a new 
state, they will be held responsible for their previous malicious cyber activities but this 
will not go too far since their international law obligations are limited. It will not cover 
for example violations of the non-intervention norm or violations of human rights since 
they are not bound by these norms according to current international law doctrine.  
It can thus be concluded that, although Article 9 ASR and Article 10 ASR confirm that a 
state is not responsible for the activities of non-state actors that govern parts of its 
territory, they still fail to address adequately the responsibility arising from the acts of 
those non-state actors.  
Another major challenge posed to the law of state responsibility by ungoverned spaces 
is that, even if a non-state malicious act is attributed to a state, its wrongfulness may be 
precluded because the state may claim force majeure.37 In order to apply this defence, 
the intervening events that led to loss of authority need to be unforeseen and beyond 
the control of the state. Ultimately, the matter turns on the question of whether the state 
could have foreseen its implosion or partial withdrawal of its authority. It can be argued 
that because there are always root causes to state implosion, this state of affairs is not ǮǯǤ, it can be counter-argued that state implosion 
is the result of many endogenous and exogenous factors such as corruption, ethnic 
conflict, financial policies, repression, some of which are foreseen whereas others are 
not and therefore it is impossible for the state to control them as it is the case with 
Syria.   
Finally, when a state is not effective, it cannot be held responsible for failing in its 
obligation of due diligence because it lacks the requisite capacity and control to 
                                                                                                                                                        
30 November 2005, paras 88Ȃ170; ICTY, Prosecutor v Haradinaj, Balaj and Brahimaj, Judgement, IT-04-
84-T, Trial Chamber I, 3 April 2008, paras 37Ȃ60,   
37 Art 23 ASR 
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implement that duty.38 The obligation of due diligence requires from states to ensure 
respect of their international law obligations and not to allow their territory to be used 
to the detriment of the rights of other states.39 Due diligence is a corollary of the 
principle of state sovereignty and non-intervention. ǡǮ
can be allowed to protect its interests therein, the territorial state must be held     ǯǤ40 In cyberspace, it means that states 
should ensure the hygiene of their cyber infrastructure and prevent or punish non-state 
actors that use its cyber infrastructure to perpetuate malicious activities against other 
states. Due diligence is however an obligation of conduct.41 States should have the 
capacity and use it in order to prevent, suppress and mitigate wrongful acts emanating 
from their territory. Because the obligation of due diligence is assessed by capacity, 
ungovernmentability means that there is limited or no institutional, legal or resource 
capacity to implement this obligation whereas non-state actors, according to the 
prevalent view, are not bound by any obligation of due diligence. In the case of ISIS for 
example neither Syria can be held responsible for violating its due diligence obligation 
with regard to ISIS malicious cyber activities from its territory, nor ISIS for the 
malicious cyber activities emanating from the territory it controls. 
From the preceding exposition it can be said that, faced with ungoverned spaces, 
international law suffers from responsibility deficit. More specifically, in the absence of 
an effective state, the ingredients of international responsibility cannot be satisfied   ǯ     -state actors exercising 
effective control over territories and people allows them to operate with legal impunity. 
In such cases, it is not only non-state actors that evade responsibility but also states 
with non-state actors on their territory that evade responsibility for the acts of non-
state actors. The problem is even more exacerbated in cyberspace because of the low 
entry barriers and the ǯǤ 
Such responsibility deficit ultimately challenges the integrity, validity, and relevance of 
international law as a force of order in international relations.42 For this reason, the 
dynamics unleashed by the existence and activities of non-state actors need to be 
recognised and international law needs to enquiry further as to whether and under 
what circumstances non-state actors can be carriers of duties and responsibilities. In 
this way, international law can fulfil its function as the normative foundation of the 
international order.    
 
V. Non-state actor responsibility: an international law framework  
 
In what follows, I will propose criteria and set out conditions under which non-state 
actors can be held directly responsible for their malicious cyber activities.  
                                                 
38 See ǯ 
39 Corfu Channel case, ICJ Rep (1949), 3, 22, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory 
Opinion, ICJ (1995), paras 241-2 
40 ǤǡǮǯǡ ? ?RC (1950), 386 
41 Bosnia Genocide Case, para 430 
42 Michael Crawford and Jami Miscik, The Rise of the Mezzanine Rulers: The New Frontier for International 
Law, 89(6) Foreign Affairs 123 (2010) 
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The main criterion for holding non-state actors responsible is that of effectiveness.  A 
non-state actor should exercise effective authority and control over territory and people 
to trigger its international law rights, duties and responsibility.43 Authority is the power 
to decide, order, direct, delegate, and enforce compliance whereas control is the legal 
and material power to effectuate such authority. The effective exercise of authority and 
control is enabled by an organisational structure. Organisation refers to a stable 
arrangement that includes structures, institutions, processes and rules about activities, 
roles, aims, decision-making, and means of ensuring compliance. Having an organisation 
is critical because it provides the non-state actor with capacity to will and capacity to 
act and is the medium through which authority over people and territory becomes 
effective. Moreover, an organisation makes the non-state actor independent from its 
members, underpinning its separate personality.  
A non-state actor that exhibits these traits of effectiveness should be recognised as a 
legal personǤǮa certain actor 
[is] a separate and independent entity' for legal purposes44 and consequently subject to 
international law rights and obligations.45 Legal personality is a legal ascription 
superimposed on effectiveness. By granting legal personality, international law confers 
legal status to an effectivity that exists and operates in international relations and 
consequently accepts it as an actor with legal rights and obligations. Refusing to grant 
legal personality means that the relations between legal subjects and such effectivities 
or the actions of such effectivities remain outside legal regulation, even if they affect 
other legal subjects such states or affect the rights of the people over whom they 
exercise power or affect international law in general. The ǯ    
eventuality was quite pragmatic as it becomes evident in its Reparations Advisory 
Opinion where the Court ascribed legal personality to the United Nations, a non-state 
actor, because of its functions, the capacity to possess rights and duties and the 
possession of organs with separate will from that of its member states. The Court also 
noted in its Advisory Opinion that attribution of personality relates to the µUHTXLUHPHQWV
RI LQWHUQDWLRQDO OLIH¶ and the needs of states to interact with other actors.46 The 
correlation between legal personality and effectiveness is also evident in the 
recognition of belligerency and insurgency.47   
   
The immediate question is whether cyber groups that is, groups that are formed in 
cyberspace and operate only in cyberspace can exhibit these hallmarks of effectiveness 
in order to be recognised as legal persons. The answer is in the negative. First, notions 
of control over territory or people are difficult to apply in the case of cyber groups. This 
means that cyber groups lack the substratum of territory and people upon which 
effectiveness can be manifested. Secondly, concerning the element of organisation, it is 
true that cyber groups often act in a coordinated manner.48 This can involve 
encouragement of members to take action, publication of lists of targets, selection of 
                                                 
43 In this way, non-state actors are differentiated from criminal groups.  
44 Janne Nijman, The Concept of International Legal Personality: An Inquiry into the History and Theory of 
International Law (2004), 3 
45 ǡǮǯǡ ? ?Ius Gentium, (2005), 37, 47 
46 ICJ, Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion of 11 April 
1949, at 178-9 
47 Antonio Cassese, International Law, 2nd ed., (OUP, 2005), 124-131  
48 Tallinn Manual, 89  
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cyber weapons, attacks and post-attack evaluation.49 The attacks on TV5Monde or on 
Estonia in 2007 and on Georgia in 2008 indeed followed such a pattern. Yet, 
coordination is not necessarily synonymous with organisation as defined above and 
many cyber groups are ephemeral and spontaneous formations of people or activities 
with loose, if any, hierarchical structures. For example AnonymouǮ
very loose and decentralised command structure that operates on ideas than ǯǤ50 Even if cyber groups exhibit certain organisational characteristics,51 these 
are not often visible or distinct as to make the group independent from its members and 
to transform individual actions into group actions. In virtual groups, it is often difficult 
to distinguish conduct committed on an individual capacity from group conduct and, 
moreover, membership may not be known. Thirdly, in the absence of legal or material 
power to enforce authority, the degree of authority and control exerted over members 
is quite weak and expectations of proper conduct cannot be imposed on members. 
Moreover, in the absence of group cohesion and of visibility of members, authority and 
control cannot be internalised. Even if the group excludes members or applies other 
virtual sanctions, such measures are more or less social sanctions and do not translate 
into real life consequences. Members can easily circumvent authority and control and 
the effectiveness of sanctions is diminished by role playing.52 Fourthly, the 
manifestation of authority and control in cyber is not inherent to the organisation but is 
dependent on and is mediated by the software system; it is the software system that 
provides the means and determines what can be done or cannot be done. For all these 
reasons, it can be said that cyber groups fail the test of effectiveness which is necessary 
for being recognised as legal persons.  
However, non-state actors that exist off-line but operate also on-line can exhibit the 
aforementioned traits of effectiveness but a question that may be asked is whether their 
character has any bearing on their recognition as a legal person. It is submitted that as 
long as their primary activities and the bulk of their activities are lawful, the 
unlawfulness of some of their activities will not have any bearing on their status. For 
example, an effective non-state actor that exercises authority and control over territory 
and people and performs functions related to such authority yet it also engages in drug 
trafficking will not loose its legal status but may be held responsible for its unlawful 
activities. To some extent, effectiveness precedes normativity. If normativity were to 
precede effectiveness, then we may be faced with the absurd situation of non-state 
actors who exercise effective control over people and territory evading responsibility 
because of some illegal conduct. It is only in relation to peremptory (jus cogens) norms 
that normativity precedes effectiveness. Consequently, an effective non-state actor that 
commits breaches of core jus cogens norms53  will not be recognised as an international 
                                                 
49 Eneken Tikk, Kadri Kaska, Liis Vihul, International Cyber Incidents: legal considerations, Cooperative 
Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCD COE), 2010 
50 ANON OPS: A Press Release, December 10, 2010,  
http://www.wired.com/images_blogs/threatlevel/2010/12/ANONOPS_The_Press_Release.pdf  
(accessed 31 January 2016) 
51 Rain Ottis identifies three models: Forum, Cell and Hierarchy.  The last one is state organised. R. Ottis, Ǯ    ǯ  Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on 
Information Warfare and Security, (Washington DC. Reading: Academic Publishing Limited, 2011), 307-
313 
52 ǤǡǮ
ǯǡ ?European Journal 
for Law and Technology (2012) 
53 It is outside the scope of this paper to define jus cogens norms but the prohibition of aggression, 
genocide and of crimes against humanity  are widely accepted as such norms  
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law person. The reason being that legal personality, as was said, is the way international 
law demarcates its boundaries by incorporating Ǯǯ into its domain but 
international law is defined by certain constitutional principles of which jus cogens 
norms form a part and which bind all international actors. Non-state actors that commit 
violations of jus cogens norms undermine its foundational principles and therefore they 
are not recognised by international law. It is for this reason that peremptory norms 
have been decoupled from the realm of effectiveness as it is seen by the sanction of non-
recognition of situations brought about by a violation of these norms.54  In the case at 
hand, it means that ISIS will fail in this respect.55  
The next issue concerns the scope of international law rights and obligations incumbent 
upon such non-state actors. It is submitted that they have those rights and obligations 
that form part of international customary law56 because customary law is the minimum 
law that applies to international law ǯ
expectations of lawful behaviour. It does not however follow that non-state actors will 
have the totality of international customary rights and duties but only those that relate 
to their functions. This has been affirmed by the ICJ in the Reparations Advisory Opinion 
where the Court introduced a differentiated system of legal rights and obligations 
depending on the functions of legal persons.57 Legal personality is not in other words 
synonymous with uniformity of legal obligations. That having been said, all non-state 
actors that exercise some form of power over territories and people should be bound by 
jus cogens norms which constitute the fundamental principles of international law58 as 
                                                 
54 Article 40 and 41 ASR 
55 The SC or states treated ISIS as a terrorist group even if it has the hallmarks of a state. SC Res  2161 
(2014); SC Res 2199 (2015); SC Res 2249 (2015); SC Res 2253 (2015). According to President Obama Ǯ     Ǥ      ?   ǡ    
sectarian strife and Syria's civil war to gain territory on both sides of the Iraq-Syrian border. It is 
recognized by no government, nor the people it subjugates. ISIL is a terrorist organization, pure and Ǥǯ ǣ   ?       ȋ ? ?   ? ? ? ?Ȍ
http://edition.cnn.com/2014/09/10/politics/transcript-obama-syria-isis-speech/ 
 
56 Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt, Advisory Opinion, ICJ 
Reports 1980, 73, 89-9. Human Rights Council, Report of the independent international commission of 
inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic ȀȀ ? ?Ȁ ? ?ȋ ? ? ? ? ? ?Ȍǡǡ ? ?ǣǮ-state actors 
cannot formally become parties to international human rights treaties. They must nevertheless respect 
the fundamental human rights of persons forming customary international law (CIL), in areas where such 
actors exercise de facto ǯǤU.N. H.R.C. Rep. of the International Commission of Inquiry to investigate 
all alleged violations of international human rights law in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Feb. 25, 2011-June 
1, 2011, { 72, U.N. Doc. A/17/44; GAOR, 17th Sess., Supp. No. 44 (2011) Report of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights on the situation of human rights in Mali, UN Doc A/HRC/22/33, 7 January 
2013; Ben Emmerson, the Special Rapporteur on the protection of human rights while countering 
terrorism A/HRC/29/51, 16 June 2015, at paras 30-31; Commission of Inquiry on Gaza (2015) 
A/HRC/10/22, para. 21   
57 Reparations Advisory Opinion, para 178 
58 Report of the independent international commission of inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic  ȀȀ ? ?Ȁ ? ?ǡ  ? ?	  ? ? ? ?ǡ  ? ? ?ǣ ǮǤǤ  ǡ, human rights 
obligations constituting peremptory international law (ius cogens) bind States, individuals and non-State ǡǤǯ 
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well as by those international  norms relevant to their functions and the particular 
context.    
The next issue that needs to be considered is that of attribution because attribution 
links the wrongful act to a subject of rights and duties for purposes of responsibility. 
One could apply by analogy the attribution tests found in the law of state responsibility 
which, as explained above, include an institutional, a functional and an agency test. In 
the first place, acts of their organs will automatically be attributed to the non-state 
actor. Such organs may be de jure organs, for example organs that represent the non-
state actor such as its leader but also de facto organs that is, organs assimilated to the 
non-state apparatus. This shows the importance of organisation for purposes of 
responsibility because international law relies on internal law and regulations to make 
such determinations. However, non-state actors may not have or, even if they have, they 
may not publicise their internal organisational structure for security reasons, leading 
thus to inferences to be made about their organisation and, possibly, more emphasis to 
be placed on the concept of de facto organs. 
This having been said, it is interesting to see how attribution plays out in the case of 
ISIS, a non-state actor, and of the pro-ISIS cyber groups. ISIS possesses a state-like 
internal organisation. It has a supreme leader, the Caliph, deputies, a Shura 
(consultative) council as well as councils for defence, security and intelligence, military 
affairs, information, judicial, and finance.59 Its military force including incorporated 
groups of foreign fighters over whom ISIS exercises full command and control is an ISIS 
organ. It follows that their acts, including their cyber activities will be automatically 
attributed to ISIS. Concerning ISIS media people or, at least, senior media people, they 
can be equivalent to de facto organs. According to an article published in The 
Washington Post which was based on extensive interviews with a number of repentant 
ISIS militants, senior ISIS ǲǡǳ  
military counterparts, they are well paid and they are directly involved in decisions on 
strategy and territory.60 Their malicious cyberactivities will be equally attributed to 
ISIS. Concerning pro-ISIS cyber groups, none of these groups has received any formal 
recognition by ISIS, although some of them were led by persons who joined ISIS and 
vowed allegiance to its leader and to its cause. It can be said therefore that those 
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individuals are de jure organs.61 For de facto organ what is needed is complete 
dependence and control.62 Whether the same can be said with regard to members of the 
cyber groups or the cyber group itself can be debated since members were recruited on 
an ad hoc basis from the hactivist world. Ideological inspiration or influence is not 
adequate for making them de facto organs or for attributing their acts to ISIS even if 
such acts support its aims. Also, according to. US reports, Cyber Caliphate was not 
affiliated to ISIS neither was it endorsed by ISIS.63  As for the newly formed United 
Cyber Caliphate (UCC), the merger was necessary to coordinate activities but there is no 
evidence that it is subordinated to ISIS.  
 Applying now the functional test of attribution to non-state actors, according to this 
test, if an individual or a group is not an organ of the non-state actor but is empowered 
to exercise elements of the authority of the non-state actor, its conduct will be 
attributed to the non-state actor.64 If the UCC for example is empowered by ISIS to 
pursue the war in the cyber domain, its activities will be attributed to ISIS. There is no 
evidence that this is the case but it is interesting to note that this mode of attributing 
conduct reflects the organised and hierarchical apparatus of modern states whereas  
with regard to non-state actors informal and implicit modes of authorisation may be 
more pertinent.  
The agency test of attribution will attribute to a non-state actors the wrongful acts of 
individuals or groups who acted on the instructions, direction  or control of that non-
state actor.65 Instructions and direction are quite difficult to prove in the absence of 
formal or publicly given orders. Regarding the criterion of control, the ICJ, rejected the Ǯ ǯ            Ǯ ǯ  which makes the possibility of attribution quite 
exceptional.66 As far as the pro-ISIS cyber groups are concerned, there is no evidence 
that ISIS instructed or directed them to attack specific targets. Effective control which 
requires direct influence in the commission of a specific act cannot also be proven. If 
however ISIS provides financial assistance or training to the newly formed UCC and 
approves their operations, one can say that it will wield overall control over UCC but, as 
was said, this is not sufficient to establish responsibility.  
Finally, if a non-state actor acknowledges and adopts as its own certain conduct, that 
conduct should be attributed to the non-state actor.67  For this to happen, the non-state 
actor needs to adopt the conduct as its own, as if it has been committed by itself.  ISIS or 
other non-state actors may praise, approve of or take credit of attacks for various 
reasons including propaganda and publicity but adoption requires engagement with the 
                                                 
61 A number of them were killed in drone attacks. At a state level, the US Cyber Command and Unit 61395 
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62 Nicaragua Case para 109; Bosnia Genocide Case paras 390-391, 307. 
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act. With regard to cyber attacks attributed to pro-ISIS groups, ISIS has praised the 
attacks but it did not claim them as its own, neither did it engage in furthering the 
attacks.  
It transpires that attribution proves to be the Achilles heel of ascribing responsibility to 
non-state actors. At this juncture it should be noted that non-state actors exercising 
authority over territories and people may operate under alternative structures of 
authority, not corresponding to current international law standards based on western 
bureaucratic structures. This means that the current standards may not be able to 
encapsulate the reality of non-state organisation and thus different standards may need 
to be introduced based on more informal structures of authority or different 
interpretations are needed of what, for example, constitutes a de jure or a de facto organ 
in a non-state apparatus.  
 
VI. Implementation of non-state actor responsibility  
Notwithstanding these difficulties, if a non-state actor is eventually found responsible 
for a malicious cyber activity, the means of implementing its responsibility do not give 
rise to many difficulties. The non-state actor has an obligation to cease the wrongful 
conduct, to continue performing the obligation, to offer assurances of non-repetition 
and to make full reparation in the form of restitution, compensation and satisfaction.68  
Although in principle non-state actors can easily fulfil these obligations, there are 
currently no formal mechanisms where non-state actors, states or individuals can apply 
in order to have such responsibility implemented. The only implementation 
mechanisms currently suited to non-state actors are arbitration, monitoring 
mechanisms or sanctions by states and international organisations.69 The role of the 
Security Council in this regard is pivotal in reaffirming the obligations of non-state 
actors, in requesting action plans to implement obligations,70 or in imposing sanctions. 
The SC can play the same role in relation to cyber by reminding non-state actors of the 
obligations attached to their cyber behaviour and conduct or by imposing sanctions for 
their cyber transgressions. For example the SC can instruct states and other non-state 
actors to freeze assets of non-state actors or not to transfer technologies or products. 
A related question is whether states and international organisations or other non-state 
actors can take countermeasures including cyber countermeasures against a non-state 
actor that breached international law obligations with its cyber activities.71 
Countermeasures are decentralised means of enforcing international law and of 
implementing responsibility. Current international law confines countermeasures to 
states and international organisations, as the two subjects of international law. Under 
the proposed framework where non-state actors enjoy a measure of international 
personality, there is nothing to preclude the imposition of countermeasures on non-
state actors provided that the acting state or international organisation and the non-
state actor are bound by certain obligations. For example, if there are bilateral or 
multilateral agreements between states and non-state actors, for example cyber arms 
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control agreements or cyber security agreements, breach of the agreement by the non-
state actor may engage its responsibility and trigger cyber or physical countermeasures. 
Also breach of customary international law obligations binding states, international 
organisations and non-state actors would trigger countermeasures. For example, if both 
non-state actors and states are bound by the customary law norm of non-intervention, 
breach of that norm by a non-state actor by ǯ
would legitimise the state to take countermeasures against the responsible non-state 
actor. The same would hold true between non-state actors. If non-state actors are bound 
by bilateral or multilateral agreements or by international law obligations, breach of an 
obligation may trigger countermeasures by the affected non-state actors. Whether non-
state actors would be able to take countermeasures against states that breached 
obligations towards them, the answer should be in the affirmative under the proposed 
framework. If a non-state actor commits violations of jus cogens rules, this may trigger 
coordinated action to put an end to such violations.72 This situation is not different from 
existing practice where states and international organisations such as the United 
Nations take action against non-state actors for violations of jus cogens norms. Under 
the framework proposed here, non-state actors could also take countermeasures 
against other non-state actors. One may use as an example the decision of Anonymous to 
attack ISIS websites in retaliation for the Paris attacks in order for the acts not to go Ǥ	ǮǯǤ73              
 
VII. Conclusion 
The preceding discussion has demonstrated that ungoverned spaces coupled with the 
existence of powerful non-state actors who operate from such territories pose serious 
challenges to international law and to the institution of international responsibility 
because, at present, neither the state nor the ruling non-state actor can be held 
responsible for violations of international law. The emerging state of irresponsibility 
can be reversed by recognising effective non-state actors as carriers of rights, duties and 
responsibility. Effectiveness is thus the modicum for legal recognition as well as for the 
realisation of international law and of international responsibility. Effectiveness will 
however limit the number of actors that can be thus recognised with cyber groups 
failing to satisfy this condition. This means that a large number of non-state actors will 
still evade responsibility. The answer is not thus fully satisfactory if it is also admitted 
that processes and forums to implement their responsibility are lacking. It is submitted 
that unless international law engages in a radical conceptual, institutional and 
structural rebooting, the place, role and consequences of non-state actors will remain 
uncertain.  
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